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Using the Message Security Protocol
to Support the Directory Access
Protocol

M. K. F. Lai

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Using the Message Security Protocol to Support the Directory Access Protocol

M.K.F. Lai

**Information Technology Division
Electronics and Surveillance Research Laboratory**

DSTO-RR-0063

ABSTRACT (U)

This paper is part of the documentation series produced under the HQADF sponsored task “D6: A Security Architecture for Large, Distributed Multimedia Systems”. It proposes to use the Message Security Protocol (MSP) for providing the security service support to the Directory Access Protocol (DAP). This may be viewed as an interim option for the directory service implementation before the militarised DAP is finalised and its trusted directory user agent becomes available. Specifically, this paper focuses on the necessary protocol elements of MSP for supporting the security requirements of the DAP.

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Using the Message Security Protocol to Support the Directory Access Protocol

Executive Summary (U)

This paper is part of the document series produced under the HQADF sponsored task “D6: A Security Architecture for Large, Distributed Multimedia Systems”. The earlier DSTO paper [1] has discussed the rationale for creating a national specific extension field within the Message Security Protocol (MSP) [2] and its intended usage. This paper is a subsequent exploration of the current MSP technology for supporting one of the applications identified in [1].

A message handling system is a communications infrastructure that provides users the ability to exchange and distribute messages electronically. In order to provide messaging users the necessary flexibility and efficiency, the users need to access the directory service. An analogue is the accessing of the ‘white pages’ by the telephone users. While the security of messaging systems is being addressed in terms of the ‘writer-to-reader’ security, very little has been proposed or developed for secure directory access. This paper aims to discuss the directory access security based on the developing or adopted military security technologies for messaging. Specifically, this paper addresses the Directory Access Protocol (DAP) [7] between a user and the directory. This protocol allows the user to request the directory operations (including reading, searching, and modifying the directory information). It also provides the directory the procedure to respond to the user’s request. The MSP [2] has been designed to address the security requirements for electronic message writers and readers. These requirements are exactly some of those that also are required by the directory operation requests and responses of the DAP.

While the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) nations have approved the MSP adoption and the MSP user agent implementation is starting to appear in the market place, the ACP133 (which is the military standard that provides the directory security service definition) remains to be finalised. The security services embedded in the current DAP are not as strong as those provided by the MSP. There are additional facilities defined in the MSP which are also useful for the directory services. It is therefore reasonable to infer that the CCEB would wait for the completion of ACP133 before it decides on the DAP adoption.

In the meantime, many X.500 compliant directory systems are appearing to meet the user demand, although the security services (provided by the associated directory user and system agents) are not necessarily trusted in terms of the military requirement. To meet the immediate military requirement for querying X.500 directory systems of various

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classification levels and modifying their entries, this paper aims to outline an interim option to use the MSP for providing the following security service support to the DAP:

- user identity authentication - associated with the directory binding request;
- directory identity authentication - associated with the directory binding response;
- non-repudiation with proof of operation request - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation requests;
- non-repudiation with proof of read or search result origin - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- non-repudiation with proof of delivery of read or search result - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- confidentiality - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation requests and all the read and search operation results.

The DAP (which specifies the directory operation argument and result syntax) is used by the Directory User Agent (DUA) to request an operation, and by the Directory System Agent (DSA) to respond the request. This paper suggests that

- a MSP user agent (MSPUA) (for the directory user) resides between the DUA and the OSI application services; and
- a MSP directory agent (MSPDA) (for the directory) resides between the DSA and the OSI application services.

To provide the above security services, the MSPUA and MSPDA use the protocol **Msp** to communicate between themselves. The MSPUA uses an instance of the **Msp** to encapsulate a directory argument of the DUA as an extension value within the **Extensions** field. Upon its arrival, the MSPDA processes the **Msp** instance and checks that the originator has applied the claimed security services. If the check succeeds, it then passes the directory argument (found in the encapsulation) to the DSA. When the DSA responds to the directory argument, the MSPDA similarly encapsulates the responding directory result of the DSA in an instance of the **Msp** which then is sent to the MSPUA.

For each of the directory operation arguments and results of the DAP, it is required that an instance of the **Msp** is defined for its encapsulation. This paper presents the detail of these **Msp** instances in the appendix (Section 8). It also explains that the encapsulation occurs at the **Extensions** field of the **Msp**. The **Extensions** field is more flexible to use and adopt because it is required only that a new **Extension** is registered (so that an **extnID** is assigned), along with its syntax and the elements of procedure for the originator and recipient [2]. Finally, this paper discusses some protected DAP associations (that become possible because of the security protection provided by the MSP), as well as the current limitations. The option of using the MSP therefore may be viewed as an interim step in the migration towards the fine grain directory entry access control security services.

- [1] Anderson M. & Lai M.K.F. 'Applications for National Specific Extension Fields Within the Message Security Protocol'. DDSTO Report. DSTO-GD-0070. Nov. 1995.
- [2] SDNS Secure Data Network System Message Security Protocol (MSP) Specification, Revision 3.1. SDN.701. Aug 1995.

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1 Introduction

This paper is part of the document series produced under the HQADF¹ sponsored task “D6: A Security Architecture for Large, Distributed Multimedia Systems”. The earlier DSTO paper [1] has discussed the rationale for creating a national specific extension field within the Message Security Protocol (MSP) [2] and its intended usage. This paper is a subsequent exploration of the current MSP technology for supporting one of the applications identified in [1]. Specifically, this paper addresses the directory services of secure querying and updating directory information.

A directory consists of a set of systems which provide users the service associated with the information that they collectively hold. This service is the simple capability to retrieve and modify information stored in the directory. The directory service, protocols for communications between systems of the directory, and the abstract models of the directory information are specified in the X.500 series of standards (described in [3]). For the purpose of this paper, a directory loosely is called a X.500 directory if it can provide the X.500 service, can support the X.500 protocols, and can handle information based on the DIB models.

This paper specifically addresses the protocol (called the Directory Access Protocol (DAP)) between a user and the directory. This protocol allows the user to request the directory operations (including reading, searching, and modifying the directory information). It also provides the directory the procedure to respond to the user’s request.

The Message Security Protocol (MSP) [2] has been designed to address the security requirements for electronic message writers and readers. It focuses on the confidentiality, data-origin authentication, and non-repudiation with proof of origin and delivery security services for a message between the writer and reader. These are exactly some of the security services that also are required by the directory operation requests and responses of the DAP.

While the Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB) nations have approved the MSP adoption and the MSP user agent implementation is starting to appear in the market place, the ACP133 (which is the military standard that provides the directory security service definition) remains to be finalised. The security services embedded in the current DAP are not as strong as those provided by the MSP. Most notably, the confidentiality service has not been defined for the DAP. There are additional facilities defined in the MSP which are also useful for the directory services. These include partition or local rule based access control,

1. Headquarters Australian Defence Force.

and security labelling (which can be used for addressing the users' privilege requirements). It is therefore reasonable to infer that the CCEB would wait for the completion of ACP133 before it decides on the DAP adoption.

In the meantime, many X.500 compliant directory systems are appearing to meet the user demand, although the security services (provided by the associated directory user and system agents) are not necessarily trusted in terms of the military requirement. This user demand is driven by the current introduction of the Defense Message System (DMS) in the US, the Defence Message and Directory System (DMDS) in Australia, and other similar programs in the allied nations [4]. To meet the immediate military requirement for querying X.500 directory systems of various classification levels and modifying their entries, this paper aims to outline an interim option to use the MSP for providing the following security service support to the DAP:

- user identity authentication - associated with the directory binding request;
- directory identity authentication - associated with the directory binding response;
- non-repudiation with proof of operation request - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation requests;
- non-repudiation with proof of read or search result origin - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- non-repudiation with proof of delivery of read or search result - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- confidentiality - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation requests and all the read and search operation results.

Furthermore, the partition rule based access control (PRBAC) and local rule based access control (LRBAC) facilities (defined in [2]) of MSP also may be associated with a specific user's directory operation requests (including bind, read, search, and modify requests) to a given directory system. In this way, limited control for accessing the directory system can be realised.

In the discussion of the above security services in the following sections, this paper assumes the existence of the trusted MSP user agent and the trusted path between the agent and the user. They are prerequisites for implementing the primary MSP application (namely the writer-to-reader secure messaging service) and so are not specific to the additional MSP application for the directory service (which is the focus of this paper). The composition of trusted components for providing the trusted MSP user agent is outside the scope of this paper. The issues related to the trusted composition will be discussed elsewhere [5]. This paper focuses only on the protocol elements of MSP necessary for supporting the security requirements of the DAP.

2 X.500 Directory and the Directory User Operations

A directory consists of a set of systems which provide users the service associated with the information that they collectively hold. This service is the simple capability to retrieve and modify information stored in the directory. The collective information is known as the directory information base (DIB) of the directory [3]. The directory service, protocols for communications between systems of the directory, and the abstract models of the DIB are specified in the X.500 series of standards (described in [3]). For the purpose of this paper, a directory loosely is called an X.500 directory if it can provide the X.500 service, can support the X.500 protocols, and can handle information based on the DIB models.

The directory service is provided to a user by means of a number of directory operations [6]. These directory operations are of four different kinds, all of which are initiated by the user:

- directory bind operations, which provide the binding and subsequent unbinding for an association between the requesting user and the directory;
- directory read operations, which interrogate a single directory entry during the association;
- directory search operations, which interrogate potentially several directory entries during the association; and
- directory modify operations during the association.

The directory bind operations include

- **DirectoryBindArgument** and **DirectoryUnbind** (initiated from the user); and
- **DirectoryBindResult** or **DirectoryBindError** (used by the directory to respond).

The directory read operations include

- **ReadArgument** and **CompareArgument** (initiated from the user); and
- **ReadResult**, **CompareResult**, or **ERRORS** (used by the directory to respond).

The directory search operations include

- **SearchArgument** and **ListArgument** (initiated from the user); and
- **SearchResult**, **ListResult** or **ERRORS** (used by the directory to respond).

The directory modify operations include

- **AddEntryArgument**, **RemoveEntryArgument**, **ModifyEntryArgument**, and **ModifyDNArgument** (initiated from the user); and
- **AddEntryResult**, **RemoveEntryResult**, **ModifyEntryResult**, **ModifyDNResult**, or **ERRORS** (used by the directory to respond).

2.1 Directory Access Protocol (DAP)

The requests and responses of the above directory operations are carried out by the directory protocols. In the case of the user-directory association, which is the focus of this paper, the responsible directory protocol that carries out the user's operation requests (in terms of

operation arguments) and the directory's responses (in terms of operation results or **ERRORS**) is the directory access protocol (DAP). The DAP is defined in the standard [7].

In an actual implementation, the DAP is used by the two entities called the directory user agent (DUA) and directory system agent (DSA) instead of the user-directory pair. There is precisely one DUA for each user. The DUA performs the directory operation requests on behalf of the user. It also displays the subsequent operation responses (from the directory) to the user. On the other hand, the DSA could be part or the whole of the directory, depending on how much of the DIB it contains. Some DSAs are built from relational databases, others from hierarchical databases, and others from purpose built databases. The only common (DSA) characteristic (that all these many different types of database must share) is the ability to respond to the directory operation requests, and to understand the directory protocols, including specifically the DAP. The following diagram (Figure 1) represents the DAP interaction between a DUA and a DSA [8].




Figure 1 DAP Interaction [8]

2.2 Application Services Used by the DAP

In realising the DAP interaction between a DUA and a DSA across the network, the X.500 directory specifications [7] assumes that the DUA and the DSA use two OSI application services. They are the association control service (ACSE) [9] and the remote operations service (ROSE) [10].

The ACSE is used to establish the association between the DUA and the DSA. The directory bind operations are mapped onto the parameters of ACSE. The DUA is the initiator of the directory binding operation (**directoryBindArgument**) and therefore of the association.

The ROSE provides a simple request-response type of service. The DUA provides one of the directory read, search or modify operation requests (such as **ReadArgument**,

SearchArgument, or **AddEntryArgument**) to the ROSE in terms of the parameters of the ROSE service primitives. The ROSE packages the request correctly, sends it to the peer ROSE of the DSA, and gives its DUA the reply when it arrives.

The use of the ACSE and ROSE services is summarised in the following figure (Figure 2).




Figure 2 DAP Using OSI Application Services

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3 Using MSP to Provide Security Support to DAP

This paper intends to outline an option to use the Message Security Protocol (MSP) [2] for providing the following security service support to the DAP:

- user identity authentication - associated with **DirectoryBindArgument**;
- directory identity authentication - associated with **DirectoryBindResult**;
- non-repudiation with proof of operation request - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation arguments;
- non-repudiation with proof of read or search result origin - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- non-repudiation with proof of delivery of read or search result - associated with all the read and search operation results;
- confidentiality - associated with all the read, search, and modify operation arguments and all the read and search operation results².

For the authentication and non-repudiation services, the signature mechanism (in terms of signature generation) of MSP is applied to the directory operation arguments and results. For confidentiality, the confidentiality mechanism (in terms of the exchange of encryption key) of MSP is provided to protect the read, search, and modify operation arguments, and the read and search operation results.

Furthermore, the partition rule based access control (PRBAC) and local rule based access control (LRBAC) facilities (defined in [2]) of MSP may be associated with a specific user's directory operation requests (including bind, read, search, and modify requests) to a given directory system. In this way, limited control for accessing the directory system can be realised. For example, a user may have only the privilege to initiate a read or search operation but not to initiate any modify operation request to the directory. The period of time that a user is allowed to establish a bind operation with the directory system also can be limited through the PRBAC and LRBAC facilities of MSP. These kinds of privileges could be specified easily in the user attribute certificates (which have been defined recently in version 4.0 of MSP).

3.1 The Basic MSP Approach

The MSP provides the security services (including confidentiality, data origin authentication, non-repudiation with proof of origin or delivery, PRBAC, and LRBAC) for a message by

1. encapsulating the message in the protocol **Msp**; then
2. performing security processing on the message; and then
3. adding a security header containing information associated with the message security processing outputs.

2. The modify operation results do not contain any information [6].

The MSP specification [2] contains the details of the MSP security service provision.

The directory operation arguments may be considered as messages from DUA to DSA and the directory operation results also may be considered as messages from DSA to DUA.

For example, the MSP can provide the data origin authentication service for the **DirectoryBindArgument** and the **DirectoryBindResult** by the encapsulation, the security processing, and the addition of security header. Therefore, the user identity authentication follows from the authenticated **DirectoryBindArgument** and the directory identity authentication follows from the authenticated **DirectoryBindResult**. For the purpose of this paper, denote the MSP-protected **DirectoryBindArgument** and **DirectoryBindResult** by **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** and **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** respectively. Similarly, denote the other MSP-protected directory read, search, and modify operations:

ReadArgument, **CompareArgument**, **ListArgument**, **ReadResult**, **CompareResult**,
ListResult, **SearchArgument**, **SearchResult**, **ERRORS**, **AddEntryArgument**,
RemoveEntryArgument, **ModifyEntryArgument**, and **ModifyDNArgument**

by

MSP-ReadArgument, **MSP-CompareArgument**, **MSP-ListArgument**, **MSP-ReadResult**, **MSP-CompareResult**, **MSP-ListResult**, **MSP-SearchArgument**, **MSP-SearchResult**, **MSP-ERRORS**, **MSP-AddEntryArgument**, **MSP-RemoveEntryArgument**, **MSP-ModifyEntryArgument**, and **MSP-ModifyDNArgument**

respectively. The abstract syntax definitions of the above MSP-protected directory operation arguments and results are given in the appendix (Section 8).

3.2 Positioning MSP in the Protocol Stack

The mapping of DAP onto the ACSE and ROSE services is specified in Section 8 of [7]. The DUA should map the **DirectoryBindArgument** onto the **User Information** parameter of the **A-ASSOCIATE** request primitive while the DSA should map the **DirectoryBindResult** onto the **User Information** parameter of the **A-ASSOCIATE** response primitive. Both of the **A-ASSOCIATE** primitives are provided by the ACSE. Similarly, the directory read, search, and modify operation arguments and results are mapped onto the **User Information** parameter of the appropriate ROSE service primitives (consisting of **RO-INVOKE**, **RO-RESULT**, **RO-ERROR**, **RO-REJECT-U** and **RO-REJECT-P**), according to [6] and [10].

Hence, the ACSE service primitives present the obvious point in the protocol stack where the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** and the **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** can be the substitute for the **DirectoryBindArgument** and the **DirectoryBindResult** respectively within the

ASCE User Information parameter. Similarly, the ROSE service primitives also are the point where the MSP-protected directory read, search, and modify operation arguments and results can be the substitute for the corresponding directory read, search, and modify operation arguments and results within the ROSE User Information parameter. In other words, it is suggested that

- a MSP user agent (MSPUA) (for the directory user) resides between the DUA and the OSI application services including the ACSE and ROSE; and
- a 'MSP directory agent (MSPDA)' (for the directory) resides between the DSA and the OSI application services including the ACSE and ROSE.

The MSPUA should be the same as that for a message user who writes or reads a MSP-protected message based on X.400 [11] or ACP123 [12]. The MSPDA would be similar to the MSPUA except that it would not initiate the ACSE or ROSE service primitive requests. Its role is only to respond to the peer MSPUA's operation requests such as the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** or **MSP-ReadArgument**. For example, it may use the ACSE A-ASSOCIATE response primitive only after the ACSE A-ASSOCIATE indication primitive has been received earlier. The following diagram (Figure 3) shows the placement of the MSPUA and the MSPDA.




Figure 3 The Placement of MSPUA and MSPDA

3.3 *The Composition of MSP*

According to the MSP specification [2], the protocol **Msp** is defined as a sequence of the following optional arguments (fields):

1. **originatorSecurityData**;
2. **signatureBlock**;
3. **recipientSecurityData**;
4. **contentDescription**;
5. **mlControlInformation**;
6. **extensions**;
7. **mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm**;
8. **mspSequenceSignatureCertificate**;
9. **encapsulatedContent**.

The first eight arguments form the security header of the **Msp**. The last argument **encapsulatedContent** (which is an octet string) contains the message being protected. To use the **Msp** to protect a directory operation argument or result, there are two arguments within the **Msp** where the directory operation argument or result could reside. One is the **encapsulatedContent** and the other is the **extensions**. This paper chooses to use the **extensions** argument because it would impact the interoperability less than the **encapsulatedContent** argument does. For its original inclusion in the **Msp**, it has been argued in [1] and stated in [2] that the **extensions** argument is intended for use within a local national/domain boundary while remaining global interoperability.

3.4 *Using the Extensions to Support Directory Operations*

The **extensions** field is defined in [2] as a sequence of **Extension** where **Extension** is specified as follows.

```
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
  extnID    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  critical   BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
  extnValue  OCTET STRING }
```

For the **extensions**, the MSP specification [2] states the extension processing as follows. The MSPUA checks to see if any extensions are present. For each **Extension**, if the MSPUA recognises the **extnID** of the **Extension**, the MSPUA performs the procedures specified as part of the registration of the **Extension**. If the MSPUA does not recognise the **extnID** and the **critical** is **FALSE**, the MSPUA ignores the **Extension**. If the MSPUA does not recognise the **extnID** and the **critical** is **TRUE**, the MSPUA terminates processing of the message and a security error has occurred. On the other hand, the MSP specification [2] does not specify

what actions should be taken if the MSPUA does not recognise the **encapsulatedContent**. In other words, any misuse of the **encapsulatedContent** could present a problem related to interoperability.

The **extensions** field is therefore more flexible to use and adopt. To create an **Extension**, it is required only that the **Extension** is registered (so that an **extnID** for the **Extension** can be assigned), along with its syntax and the elements of procedure for the originator and recipient (as stated in [2]). However, to use an **encapsulatedContent**, which is different from those that already exist, a new **encapsulatedContentType** is necessary. This may require the MSP specification to be updated to a new version.

In the rest of this paper, it is assumed that an **Extension** is defined for each of the directory operation arguments and results. For each such **Extension**, the **critical** argument is set to be **TRUE**. This ensures a security error if the receiving MSPDA or MSPUA does not recognise the **Extension**. The **extnValue** is a sequence consisting of the corresponding directory operation argument or result, the current time and the optional protection request. The protection request is considered only when a directory operation argument is initiated. It is not necessary to include the protection request in a directory operation result when responding to an operation request.

For example, let **DirectoryBindArgumentExtn** be the **Extension** defined for the **directoryBindArgument**. It is considered as an instance of the **Extension**. It then may be defined as follows.

```
DirectoryBindArgumentExtn      Extension ::= {
  BindArgumentExtnID,
  TRUE,
  DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue }

DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  directoryBindArgument  DirectoryBindArgument,
  dirDate                UTCTime,
  target                 ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL }

ProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {
  none (0),
  signedAndNotEncrypted (1),
  EncryptedButNotSigned (2),
  signedAndEncrypted (3) }
```

Following from the MSP Specification [2], the Type **UTCTime** is encoded using the form year, month, day, hours, minutes followed by a “Z”. The time is always expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

The **target ProtectionRequest** is borrowed from the **SecurityParameters** defined in X.511 [6] for the DAP. It may appear only in a directory operation argument (a request for an operation to be carried out). It indicates the user's preference regarding the degree of protection to be provided to the corresponding directory operation result. Instead of two levels (**none** and **signed**) as defined in [6], four levels are provided here: **none** (no protection requested), **signedAndNotEncrypted** (the MSP directory agent (MSPDA) is requested to sign but not encrypt the result), **EncryptedButNotSigned** (the MSPDA is requested to encrypt but not sign the result, the default), and **SignedAndEncrypted** (the MSPDA is requested to sign and encrypt the result). Depending on the authorisation information of the user and the DSA (possibly based on the PRBAC facility of MSP), the MSPDA could ignore **none** and it encrypts but does not sign the result. For the same reason, the MSPDA could ignore **signedAndNotEncrypted** and it signs and encrypts the result.

The **DirectoryBindArgumentExtn** should be used by the MSP user agent (MSPUA) and it also should be recognised by the target MSP directory agent (MSPDA). To protect the **directoryBindArgument**, it is enough to provide the necessary security services (in terms of signature generation and encryption) to the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**. The next section will show how these security services are provided.

Similarly, the **DirectoryBindResultExtn** and the **DirectoryBindErrorExtn** may be defined as stated in the appendix (Section 8).

4 MSP-Supported Directory Bind Operations

This section considers the syntax of only the directory bind operations, as our main example of the application of MSP for supporting the typical directory operations. The detail of the MSP support for the other operations including read, search, and modify operations are provided in the appendix (Section 8).

For the bind operation argument or result, this section will define an instance of the **Msp** for its protection. In view of security services provided by the MSP, the original optional security-specific components in the standardised arguments and results may not be required.

The directory binding is initiated by the DUA. Using the binding, the DUA automatically may bind to the home DSA when the user first logs on to the application, or when he/she makes the first directory request. The abstract syntax of the operation, called **directoryBind**, is given in [6]. It provides the **DirectoryBindArgument**, **DirectoryBindResult** and **DirectoryBindError**.

4.1 MSP-Directory Bind Argument

The MSP-supported **DirectoryBindArgument** is denoted by **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** and it is defined as follows.

The **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** is considered as an instance of the **Msp** and it should be originated by a MSPUA only. Hence, it inherits the abstract syntax structure of the **Msp**. For its definition, it is assumed that the user must select the security service (user identity authentication) from the MSPUA to support the **DirectoryBindArgument**.

The **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** is a sequence of **originatorSecurityData**, **signatureBlock**, **recipientSecurityData**, optional **contentDescription**, **directoryBindArgumentExtn**, optional **mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm**, and optional **mspSequenceSignatureCertificate**. The optional **mlControlInformation** and **encapsulatedContent** of the original **Msp** do not appear in the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** since there is no requirement for a mailing list or any other information to be carried from the DUA to the DSA. The optional **contentDescription**, **mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm**, and **mspSequenceSignatureCertificate** may be used in situations as defined in the MSP specification [2].

MSP-DirectoryBindArgument	Msp	::= SEQUENCE {
originatorSecurityData		OriginatorSecurityData,
signatureBlock		SignatureBlock,
recipientSecurityData		SET OF PerRecipientToken,
contentDescription		TeletexString OPTIONAL,

```

directoryBindArgumentExtn  DirectoryBindArgumentExtn,
mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }

```

4.1.1 *Originator Security Data*

The **OriginatorSecurityData** argument is exactly that as defined in the MSP specification [2] except that the **mlKeyToken** argument is not required.

4.1.2 *Signature Block*

The **SignatureBlock** contains information used to provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. The MSPUA calculates a digital signature, which consists of signing a hash using the originator's private cryptographic signature material. The hash is calculated by first generating a complete hash over the (original unprotected) **extnValue** (namely the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**) of the **directoryBindArgumentExtn**. This hash is the **extnhash**, which is placed in the **RecipientKeyToken**, if extension confidentiality is invoked. A second hash value is calculated over the concatenation of the **extnhash** and the **signatureInformation** within the **ControlInformation** field. This second hash is used as the input to the signature algorithm, which the MSPUA signs and includes as the **SignatureValue**. Similar to the case for messages described in [2], whenever the MSPUA applies confidentiality to the **extnValue** (namely the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**), it must apply confidentiality to the signature value of the **extnValue**.

```

SignatureBlock ::= SEQUENCE {
    signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
    signatureValue          SignatureValue,
    controlInformation      ControlInformation,
    signatureCertificate    CertificationPath OPTIONAL }

```

The **SignatureValue** is the same as that defined in [2]. It contains either the plain or the encrypted signature value of the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**.

As defined in [2], the **ControlInformation** is either the **SignatureInformation** that contains additional information from the originator including receipt requests, or the **ReceiptInformation** that contains information from the recipient used to identify the message for which the recipient has returned the receipt. The **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (which is what is being addressed in this subsection) is not a receipt. Hence, the **ControlInformation** can be only the **SignatureInformation**. Furthermore, there is no need for the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** to include a receipt request. Hence, the **SignatureInformation** consists of just the sequence of the optional **encapsulatedContentType** and the **noReceipt ReceiptsIndicator**. The **encapsulatedContentType** is **id-empty-content** (**ID ::= {id-formats 2}**) because the **MSP-**

DirectoryBindArgument does not have an **encapsulatedContent**. The **noReceipt** is the integer 0 corresponding to the case that no receipt is required.

4.1.3 *Per Recipient Token*

There is only one recipient (namely the target DSA) for the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument**. Hence, there is only one **PerRecipientToken** in the SET OF **PerRecipientToken**. The **PerRecipientToken** is a sequence of the **Tag** and the **ProtectedRecipientToken**.

```
PerRecipientToken ::= SEQUENCE {
    tag                      Tag,
    protectedRecipientKeyToken ProtectedRecipientKeyToken
}
ProtectedRecipientKeyToken ::= OCTET STRING
-- Protected form of RecipientKeyToken
```

The **Tag** is generated by the MSPUA as described in the MSP Specification [2].

The **ProtectedRecipientKeyToken** is the protected form of **RecipientKeyToken**. The **RecipientKeyToken** contains the **extnKey** that is used to protect the **extnValue** (namely the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**). The **extnHash** is calculated over the unprotected **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**.

```
RecipientKeyToken ::= SEQUENCE {
    extnKey          OCTET STRING,
    extnHash          OCTET STRING,
    signatureBlockIndicator BOOLEAN,
    additionalSecurityInfoIndicator BOOLEAN,
    encapsulatedContentType ContentType,
    securityLabel     SecurityLabel
}
```

The **signatureBlockIndicator** is set to **TRUE** if the **signatureBlock** is present in the MSP header. Hence, for the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument**, this indicator is **TRUE**. The **additionalSecurityInfoIndicator** is set to **TRUE** if the **additionalSecurityInfo** is present in **OriginatorSecurityData**. The **encapsulatedContentType** is set to the **id-empty-content** (**ID** ::= {**id-formats** 2}). The **SecurityLabel** is defined as a set of **security-policy-identifier**, **security-classification**, **privacy-mark**, and **security-categories** as specified in [2].

4.1.4 *Directory Bind Argument Extension*

The **DirectoryBindArgumentExtn** is the field that actually characterises the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument**. As defined in Section 3.4, the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtn** contains the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue**, which is a sequence of the **DirectoryBindArgument**, the **UTCTime**, and the **ProtectionRequest**.

Without the optional security-specific **credentials** argument, the **DirectoryBindArgument** would consist of just the **Versions** argument. In the standard [6], the **credentials** argument in the **DirectoryBindArgument** is designed to allow the target DSA to establish the identity of the user who is making the request through the DUA. Since the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** has achieved the same through the **originatorSecurityData**, **signatureBlock**, and **recipientSecurityData** fields as described in the previous subsections, the **credentials** may not be required in the **DirectoryBindArgument**. Hence, the **DirectoryBindArgument** may consist of the **Versions** argument only.

```
DirectoryBindArgument ::= Versions DEFAULT {v1}
Versions          ::= BIT STRING {v1 (0)}
```

4.2 *MSP-Directory Bind Result*

The MSP-supported **DirectoryBindResult** is denoted by **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** and it is defined as follows.

The **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** also is considered as an instance of the **Msp**. Hence, it inherits the abstract syntax structure of the **Msp**. It should be originated only from the MSP directory agent (MSPDA) associated with a DSA. The MSPDA does not send a **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** unless

1. it has accepted a **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** earlier;
2. the **DirectoryBindArgument** has been passed to the DSA; and
3. the DSA decides that the bind request succeeds.

In defining the **MSP-DirectoryBindResult**, it is assumed that the MSPDA must select the security service (directory identity authentication) to support the **DirectoryBindResult**. From its definition in [6], the **DirectoryBindResult** has the same syntax as the **DirectoryBindArgument**. Hence, it has the same security requirement as the **DirectoryBindArgument**.

```
MSP-DirectoryBindResult      ::= SEQUENCE {
    originatorSecurityData    OriginatorSecurityData,
    signatureBlock             SignatureBlock,
    recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,
    contentDescription          TeletexString OPTIONAL,
    directoryBindResultExtn    DirectoryBindResultExtn,
    mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    mspSequenceSignatureCertificate  CertificationPath OPTIONAL }
```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3).

For the **DirectoryBindResultExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```
DirectoryBindResultExtn  Extension ::= {
    DirectoryBindResultExtnIdentifier,
    TRUE,
    DirectoryBindResultExtnValue }
```

The **DirectoryBindResultExtnValue** is a sequence of the **DirectoryBindResult** and the **UTCTime**. Just as the case for the **DirectoryBindArgument**, the **DirectoryBindResult** consists of only the **Versions**.

```
DirectoryBindResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
    directoryBindResult    DirectoryBindResult,
    dirDate                UTCTime }
```

4.3 *MSP-Directory Bind Errors*

The MSP-supported **DirectoryBindError** is denoted by **MSP-DirectoryBindError** and it is defined as follows.

The **MSP-DirectoryBindError** also is considered as an instance of the **Msp**. It should be originated only from the MSP directory agent (MSPDA) associated with a DSA. The MSPDA does not send a **MSP-DirectoryBindError** unless

1. it has accepted a **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** earlier;
2. the **DirectoryBindArgument** has been passed to the DSA; and
3. the DSA decides that the bind request fails because of some service errors.

Since the MSP protection is available, the DSA need not address any security errors associated with the bind operation. These security errors are addressed by the MSPDA. As a result, if a security error occurs, it is indicated at the MSP level (between the MSPDA and the MSPUA).

In defining the **MSP-DirectoryBindError**, it is assumed that the MSPDA must select the security service (directory identity authentication) to support the **DirectoryBindError**.

```
MSP-DirectoryBindError      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
    originatorSecurityData   OriginatorSecurityData,
    signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
    recipientSecurityData    SET OF PerRecipientToken,
    contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
    directoryBindErrorExtn   DirectoryBindErrorExtn,
    mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }
```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-DirectoryBindError** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **DirectoryBindErrorExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```
DirectoryBindErrorExtn  Extension ::= {  
    DirectoryBindErrorExtnIdentifier,  
    TRUE,  
    DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue    }
```

The **DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue** is a sequence of the **ERROR** and the **UTCTime**.

```
DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {  
    directoryBindError    ERROR,  
    dirDate              UTCTime    }
```

The **ERROR** is defined to be a parameter set of **Versions** and **ServiceProblem** [6]. As mentioned in the above, the **directoryBindError** does not address any security errors.

5 *Some MSP-protected DUA-DSA Associations*

This section presents some protected Directory Access Protocol (DAP) associations between a directory user agent (DUA) and a directory system agent (DSA) of various classification levels that become possible because of the security protection provided by the MSP.

5.1 *DUA-DSA System High*

Suppose that both the DUA and DSA are of the same classification level and they belong to the same system high network. The DUA-DSA association is indicated by DAP (A) for their DAP interaction in Figure 4. As the confidentiality security service for the DAP is covered by that of the system high network, the MSPUA and MSPDA may not be required to provide this service. However, the MSPUA and MSPDA still are required to provide the other security services (for example, for auditing or accounting purpose).

In addition to the DUAs belonging to the same Secret enclave, the DSA also may accept the directory binding request from a DUA of higher classification level. For example, in Figure 4, the Top Secret DUA may initiate a binding request to the Secret DSA via the DAP (B) in order to query or update the DIB stored in the DSA. Similarly, the Secret DUA may initiate a binding request to the DSA located at the Combined Force HQ via the DAP (H).

5.2 *Remote DUA-DSA System High*

The Secret DUA may initiate a binding request to a remote Secret DSA via the DAP (C) in Figure 4. If the operation arguments and results of the DAP need to be transported via some networks of lower classification level, then the MSPUA and MSPDA must provide the confidentiality as well as the other security services.

5.3 *High DUA and Low DSA*

The Secret DUA may initiate a binding request to

- a Confidential DSA via the DAP (D) in Figure 4;
- a Restricted DSA via the DAP (E) in Figure 4;
- an Unclassified DSA via the DAP (F) in Figure 4;
- a DSA belonging to another Government department via the DAP (G) in Figure 4;
- a DSA belonging to the Combined Force HQ via the DAP (H) in Figure 4.

All directory arguments and results of these DAP associations are required to depart from the Secret enclave through only the MSP gateway (MSPGW). The same is true for the DAP (B) and the DAP (C) also. In this case, the **mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm** field within the **Msp** is used by the MSPUA at the Secret DUA, the MSPDA at the Secret DSA, and the MSPGW to identify the algorithm that the MSPUA and the MSPDA use to seal the **Msp** that they generate. This seal then can be verified by the MSPGW before it allows the validated

Msp to depart from the Secret enclave. According to the MSP specification [2], the Msp can be sealed by calculating a one-way hash on it and then sealing the resulting value. The sealed Msp, denoted by **SIGNED Msp** in [2], is a two-component sequence consisting of the Msp (which is the first component) and its seal value (which is the second).




Figure 4 Various MSP-enabled DUA-DSA Interactions

5.4 Classified DUA and Unclassified DSA

A DAP association between a classified DUA and an unclassified DSA is possible via the DAP (F) in Figure 4. The MSPUA at the DUA must generate the seal for the Msp which consists of only the **Extension** field. This **Extension** field contains exactly one of the directory operation arguments created by the DUA as described in Section 3.4. If the sealed Msp is validated successfully by the MSPGW, the MSPGW extracts the directory argument contained in the **extnValue** of the **Extension**, and allows it to depart from the enclave of the DUA. Furthermore, depending on the requirement of the unclassified DSA, the directory operation arguments and results could contain the **Credentials** or the **SecurityParameters**

(defined in the X.511 standard [6]) in order to achieve the minimal security services for the unclassified DSA.

5.5 Illegal Associations

With only the security services provided by the MSP encapsulation of directory operation arguments and results (described in this paper), the following associations still remain illegal.

An association between a low DUA and a high DSA is not legal. The DSA must require the finer grain security services which are applicable at the individual directory entry level in order to allow access only to those entries which can be released to the low DUA. The use of the PRBAC and LRBAC facilities of MSP are only good enough for controlling a user's access to a directory system. As explained in Section 3, this is achieved through the association with the user's directory bind, read, search, and modify operation requests.

Typically in a combined operation scenario, the DUA at the Combined Force HQ would processes national information which has been released to friendly nations. Hence, an association between a DUA located at Combined Force HQ and a Secret DSA (Figure 4) also is not legal. The DSA also must require the finer grain security services which are applicable at the individual directory entry level in order to allow access only to those entries which can be released to friendly nations.

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6 Conclusion

This paper has outlined an option to use the Message Security Protocol (MSP) for providing the security service support (including authentication, non-repudiation with proof, confidentiality, and partition and local rule based access control) to the Directory Access Protocol (DAP). The DAP (which specifies the directory operation argument and result syntax) is used by the Directory User Agent (DUA) to request an operation, and by the Directory System Agent (DSA) to respond to the request. This paper suggests (in Figure 3) that

- a MSP user agent (MSPUA) (for the directory user) resides between the DUA and the OSI application services including the ACSE and ROSE; and
- a MSP directory agent (MSPDA) (for the directory) resides between the DSA and the OSI application services including the ACSE and ROSE.

To provide the above security services, the MSPUA and MSPDA use the protocol **Msp** to communicate between themselves. The **Msp** is a sequence of several optional fields including: **originatorSecurityData**, **signatureBlock**, **recipientSecurityData**, **contentDescription**, **Extensions**, **mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm**, and **mspSequenceSignatureCertificate**.

The MSPUA uses an instance of the **Msp** to encapsulate a directory argument of the DUA as an extension value within the **Extensions** field. Upon its arrival, the MSPDA processes the **Msp** instance and checks that the originator has applied the claimed security services. If the check succeeds, it then passes the directory argument (found in the encapsulation) to the DSA. When the DSA responds to the directory argument, the MSPDA similarly encapsulates the responding directory result of the DSA in an instance of the **Msp** which then is sent to the MSPUA.

For each of the directory operation arguments and results of the DAP, it is required that an instance of the **Msp** is defined for its encapsulation. The detail of these **Msp** instances is given in the appendix (Section 8). We have seen in Section 4 that the encapsulation occurs at the **Extensions** field of the **Msp**. We also have argued in Section 3 that the **Extensions** field is more flexible to use and adopt because it is required only that a new **Extension** is registered (so that an **extnID** is assigned), along with its syntax and the elements of procedure for the originator and recipient [2]. Finally, we also have discussed some protected DAP associations (that become possible because of the security protection provided by the MSP), as well as the current limitations in Section 5. The option of using the MSP therefore may be viewed as an interim step in the migration towards the fine grain directory entry access control security services.

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7 *References*

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8 Appendix: The MSP-Supported Directory Operations

This appendix considers the syntax of the directory bind, read, search, and modify operations.

For each of the operation arguments and results, an instance of the **Msp** is defined for its protection. In view of security services provided by the MSP, the original optional security-specific components in the standardised arguments and results may not be required.

8.1 Binding Operations

The directory binding is initiated by the DUA. Using the binding, the DUA automatically may bind to the home DSA when the user first logs on to the application, or when he/she makes the first directory request. The abstract syntax of the operation, called **directoryBind**, is given in [6]. It provides the **DirectoryBindArgument**, **DirectoryBindResult** and **DirectoryBindError**.

8.1.1 MSP-Directory Bind Argument

The MSP-supported **DirectoryBindArgument** is denoted by **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** and it is defined as follows.

The **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** is considered as an instance of the **Msp** and it should be originated by a MSPUA only. Hence, it inherits the abstract syntax structure of the **Msp**. For its definition, it is assumed that the user must select the security service (user identity authentication) from the MSPUA to support the **DirectoryBindArgument**.

```
MSP-DirectoryBindArgument      Msp ::= SEQUENCE {
    originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
    signatureBlock               SignatureBlock,
    recipientSecurityData        SET OF PerRecipientToken,
    contentDescription            TeletexString OPTIONAL,
    directoryBindArgumentExtn    DirectoryBindArgumentExtn,
    mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }
```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** have been described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3. For the **DirectoryBindArgumentExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```
DirectoryBindArgumentExtn      Extension ::= {
    BindArgumentExtnID,
    TRUE,
    DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue }
DirectoryBindArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
```

```

directoryBindArgument    DirectoryBindArgument,
dirDate                  UTCTime,
target                  ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL      }

ProtectionRequest ::= INTEGER {
  none (0),
  signedAndNotEncrypted (1),
  EncryptedButNotSigned (2),
  signedAndEncrypted (3)      }

```

The **DirectoryBindArgument** is exactly that as defined in X.511 [6].

8.1.2 *MSP-Directory Bind Result*

In defining the **MSP-DirectoryBindResult**, it is assumed that the MSPDA must select the security service (directory identity authentication) to support the **DirectoryBindResult**. From its definition in [6], the **DirectoryBindResult** has the same syntax as the **DirectoryBindArgument**. Hence, it has the same security requirement as the **DirectoryBindArgument**.

```

MSP-DirectoryBindResult      MSP      ::= SEQUENCE      {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  directoryBindResultExtn    DirectoryBindResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm  AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate  CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-DirectoryBindResult** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **DirectoryBindResultExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```

DirectoryBindResultExtn  Extension  ::=  {
  DirectoryBindResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  DirectoryBindResultExtnValue      }

```

The **DirectoryBindResultExtnValue** is a sequence of the **DirectoryBindResult** and the **UTCTime**. Just as the case for the **DirectoryBindArgument**, the **DirectoryBindResult** consists of only the **Versions**.

```

DirectoryBindResultExtnValue  ::= SEQUENCE  {
  directoryBindResult        DirectoryBindResult,
  dirDate                  UTCTime      }

```

The **DirectoryBindResult** is exactly that as defined in X.511 [6].

8.1.3 MSP-Directory Bind Errors

In defining the **MSP-DirectoryBindError**, it is assumed that the MSPDA must select the security service (directory identity authentication) to support the **DirectoryBindError**.

```
MSP-DirectoryBindError      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
    originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
    signatureBlock           SignatureBlock,
    recipientSecurityData   SET OF PerRecipientToken,
    contentDescription       TeletexString OPTIONAL,
    directoryBindErrorExtn  DirectoryBindErrorExtn,
    mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }
```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-DirectoryBindError** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **DirectoryBindErrorExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```
DirectoryBindErrorExtn  Extension ::= {
    DirectoryBindErrorExtnIdentifier,
    TRUE,
    DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue }
```

The **DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue** is a sequence of the **ERROR** and the **UTCTime**.

```
DirectoryBindErrorExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
    directoryBindError  ERROR,
    dirDate            UTCTime }
```

The **ERROR** is defined to be a parameter set of **Versions** and **ServiceProblem** [6]. As mentioned in the above, the **directoryBindError** does not address any security errors.

8.2 Directory Read Operations

The directory read operation consists of the **ReadArgument**, **ReadResult**, and **ERRORS**.

The **ReadArgument** is used by the DUA to extract information from an explicitly identified entry. If the request in the **ReadArgument** succeeds, the **ReadResult** is used by the target DSA to return the information requested in the **ReadArgument**. If the request in the **ReadArgument** fails, the **ERRORS** is used by the DSA to indicates either **AttributeError**, **NameError**, **ServiceError**, **Referral**, **Abandoned**, or **SecurityError**. Denote the MSP-supported **ReadArgument**, **ReadResult**, and **ERRORS** by **MSP-ReadArgument**, **MSP-ReadResult**, and **MSP-ERRORS** respectively.

8.2.1 MSP-Read Argument

In defining the **MSP-ReadArgument**, it is assumed that the MSPUA must select the (non-repudiation with proof of operation request) security service to support the **ReadArgument**. It may select the confidentiality security service also.

```

MSP-ReadArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock          SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData  SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription     TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  readArgumentExtn        ReadArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL
}

```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-ReadArgument** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **ReadArgumentExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```

ReadArgumentExtn      Extension ::= {
  ReadArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  ReadArgumentExtnValue      }

```

The **ReadArgumentExtnValue** is a sequence of the **ReadArgument**, the **UTCTime**, and the optional **ProtectionRequest**.

```

ReadArgumentExtnValue      ::= SEQUENCE {
  readArgument          ReadArgument,
  dirDate              UTCTime,
  target                ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL
}

```

The **ReadArgument** is exactly that as defined in X.511 [6].

8.2.2 MSP-Read Result

In defining the **MSP-ReadResult**, it is assumed that the MSPDA must select the (non-repudiation with proof of operation result) security service to support the **ReadResult**. It may select the confidentiality security service also.

In addition, the MSPDA may select the (non-repudiation with proof of delivery of operation result) security service. In this case, the MSPDA requests the origin MSPUA to return a receipt when the MSPUA receives the **MSP-ReadResult**. The **ReceiptsIndicator** is set to **allReceipts** (1) within the **SignatureInformation** of the **ControlInformation**. When the MSPUA generates the receipt for the MSPDA, it follows the procedures as specified in the MSP specification [2]. The receipt then may be transported by using the ROSE services.

```

MSP-ReadResult          MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock         SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData  SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription     TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  readResultExtn         ReadResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL
}

```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-ReadResult** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **ReadResultExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```

ReadResultExtn          Extension ::= {
  ReadResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  ReadResultExtnValue
}

```

The **ReadResultExtnValue** is a sequence of the **ReadResult** and the **UTCTime**.

```

ReadResultExtnValue      ::= SEQUENCE {
  readResult           ReadResult,
  dirDate              UTCTime
}

```

The **ReadResult** is exactly that as defined in X.511 [6].

8.2.3 MSP-Errors

In defining the **MSP-ERRORS**, it is assumed that the MSPDA may select the data-origin-authentication security service to support the **ERRORS**.

```

MSP-ERRORS          MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock         SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData  SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription     TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  errorsExtn            ERRORSExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL
}

```

The requirements and the processing of the fields (**OriginatorSecurityData**, **SignatureBlock**, and **PerRecipientToken**) of the **MSP-ERRORS** are exactly those of the **MSP-DirectoryBindArgument** (described in Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3). For the **ERRORSExtn**, it is defined as an instance of the **Extension** (Section 3.4).

```

ERRORSExtn          Extension ::= {
  ERRORSExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
}

```

```
    ERRORSExtnValue          }
```

The **ERRORSExtnValue** is a sequence of the **ERRORS** and the **UTCTime**.

```
ERRORSExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {  
    ERRORS      { AttributeError | NameError | ServiceError | Referral |  
                  Abandoned | SecurityError }  
    dirDate      UTCTime }
```

As mentioned in Section 8.1.3, security errors related to the MSP security services are handled at the MSP level (between MSPDA and MSPUA). However, there are other security errors which are not handled by the MSPDA and MSPUA. One such security error is the **insufficientAccessRights** defined in X.511 [6]. It is used by the DSA to indicate that the requester does not have the right to a directory entry (which is required to carry out the requested operation). The MSP does not address the access control of the individual entries. The role of MSP is only to address the security requirements of the directory operation arguments and results between the DUA and DSA.

8.3 *Other Directory Operations*

For the other directory operations: **compare**, **search**, **list**, **addEntry**, **removeEntry**, **modifyEntry**, and **modifyDN**, their arguments and results also have the corresponding MSP-supported arguments and results. They are defined in the same way as the **MSP-ReadArgument** and the **MSP-ReadResult** are defined in Section 8.2.

8.3.1 *Compare Operations*

8.3.1.1 *Compare Argument*

```
MSP-CompareArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {  
    originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,  
    signatureBlock              SignatureBlock,  
    recipientSecurityData       SET OF PerRecipientToken,  
    contentDescription         TeletexString OPTIONAL,  
    compareArgumentExtn        CompareArgumentExtn,  
    mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,  
    mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }
```

```
CompareArgumentExtn      Extension ::= {  
    CompareArgumentExtnIdentifier,  
    TRUE,  
    CompareArgumentExtnValue }
```

```
CompareArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {  
    compareArgument          CompareArgument,  
    dirDate                 UTCTime,  
    target                  ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL }
```

8.3.1.2 Compare Result

```

MSP-CompareResult           MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock             SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData       SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription          TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  compareResultExtn          CompareResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }

CompareResultExtn          Extension ::= {
  CompareResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  CompareResultExtnValue       }
}

CompareResultExtnValue       MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  compareResult              CompareResult,
  dirDate                   UTCTime }
}

```

8.3.2 List Operations

8.3.2.1 List Argument

```

MSP-ListArgument           MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock             SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData       SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription          TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  listArgumentExtn           ListArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL }

ListArgumentExtn          Extension ::= {
  ListArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  ListArgumentExtnValue       }
}

ListArgumentExtnValue       MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  listArgument              ListArgument,
  dirDate                   UTCTime,
  target                    ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL }
}

```

8.3.2.2 List Result

```

MSP-ListResult           MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock             SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData       SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription          TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  listResultExtn             ListResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
}

```

```

mspSequenceSignatureCertificate  CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

ListResultExtn      Extension ::= {
  ListResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  ListResultExtnValue      }
}

ListResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  listResult,
  dirDate      UTCTime      }

```

8.3.3 *Search Operations*

8.3.3.1 *Search Argument*

```

MSP-SearchArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock          SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData   SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription      TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  searchArgumentExtn      SearchArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

SearchArgumentExtn      Extension ::= {
  SearchArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  SearchArgumentExtnValue      }
}

SearchArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  searchArgument          SearchArgument,
  dirDate                 UTCTime,
  target                  ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL      }

```

8.3.3.2 *Search Result*

```

MSP-SearchResult      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData  OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock          SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData   SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription      TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  searchResultExtn        SearchResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

SearchResultExtn      Extension ::= {
  SearchResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  SearchResultExtnValue      }
}

SearchResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  searchResult            SearchResult,
  dirDate                 UTCTime      }

```

8.3.4 Add Entry Operations

8.3.4.1 Add Entry Argument

```

MSP-AddEntryArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  addEntryArgumentExtn       AddEntryArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL  }
AddEntryArgumentExtn Extension ::= {
  AddEntryArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  AddEntryArgumentExtnValue   }
AddEntryArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  addEntryArgument          AddEntryArgument,
  dirDate                  UTCTime,
  target                   ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL  }

```

8.3.4.2 Add Entry Result

```

MSP-AddEntryResult      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  addEntryResultExtn         AddEntryResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL  }
AddEntryResultExtn Extension ::= {
  AddEntryResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  AddEntryResultExtnValue   }
AddEntryResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  addEntryResult          AddEntryResult,
  dirDate                  UTCTime  }

```

8.3.5 Remove Entry Operations

8.3.5.1 Remove Entry Argument

```

MSP-RemoveEntryArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData      OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,

```

```

removeEntryArgumentExtn      RemoveEntryArgumentExtn,
mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

RemoveEntryArgumentExtn Extension ::= {
  RemoveEntryArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  RemoveEntryArgumentExtnValue  }

RemoveEntryArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  removeEntryArgument      RemoveEntryArgument,
  dirDate                  UTCTime,
  target                   ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL      }

```

8.3.5.2 Remove Entry Result

```

MSP-RemoveEntryResult      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData   OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData    SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  removeEntryResultExtn     RemoveEntryResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

RemoveEntryResultExtn Extension ::= {
  RemoveEntryResultExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  RemoveEntryResultExtnValue  }

RemoveEntryResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  removeEntryResult      RemoveEntryResult,
  dirDate                  UTCTime      }

```

8.3.6 Modify Entry Operations

8.3.6.1 Modify Entry Argument

```

MSP-ModifyEntryArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData   OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock            SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData    SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  modifyEntryArgumentExtn   ModifyEntryArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }

ModifyEntryArgumentExtn Extension ::= {
  ModifyEntryArgumentExtnIdentifier,
  TRUE,
  ModifyEntryArgumentExtnValue  }

ModifyEntryArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {

```

```

modifyEntryArgument      ModifyEntryArgument,
dirDate                  UTCTime,
target                  ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL      }

```

8.3.6.2 *Modify Entry Result*

```

MSP-ModifyEntryResult      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData    OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock           SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData    SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  modifyEntryResultExtn    ModifyEntryResultExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }
ModifyEntryResultExtn Extension ::= {  

  ModifyEntryResultExtnIdentifier,  

  TRUE,  

  ModifyEntryResultExtnValue      }
ModifyEntryResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  modifyEntryResult           ModifyEntryResult,
  dirDate                   UTCTime      }

```

8.3.7 *Modify DN Operations*

8.3.7.1 *Modify DN Argument*

```

MSP-ModifyDNArgument      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData    OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock           SignatureBlock,
  recipientSecurityData    SET OF PerRecipientToken,
  contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,
  modifyDNArgumentExtn    ModifyDNArgumentExtn,
  mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
  mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }
ModifyDNArgumentExtn Extension ::= {  

  ModifyDNArgumentExtnIdentifier,  

  TRUE,  

  ModifyDNArgumentExtnValue      }
ModifyDNArgumentExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {
  modifyDNArgument           ModifyDNArgument,
  dirDate                   UTCTime,
  target                   ProtectionRequest OPTIONAL      }

```

8.3.7.2 *Modify DN Result*

```

MSP-ModifyDNResult      MSP ::= SEQUENCE {
  originatorSecurityData    OriginatorSecurityData,
  signatureBlock           SignatureBlock,

```

```
recipientSecurityData      SET OF PerRecipientToken,  
contentDescription        TeletexString OPTIONAL,  
modifyDNResultExtn        ModifyDNResultExtn,  
mspSequenceSignatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,  
mspSequenceSignatureCertificate CertificationPath OPTIONAL      }  
  
ModifyDNResultExtn      Extension ::= {  
  ModifyDNResultExtnIdentifier,  
  TRUE,  
  ModifyDNResultExtnValue      }  
  
ModifyDNResultExtnValue ::= SEQUENCE {  
  modifyDNResult        ModifyDNResult,  
  dirDate               UTCTime      }
```

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Message Processing Secure Communication Access Control	Computer Information Security Data Security (Computer) Computer Architecture					
19. ABSTRACT This paper is part of the documentation series produced under the HQADF sponsored task "D6: A Security Architecture for Large, Distributed Multimedia Systems". It proposes to use the Message Security Protocol (MSP) for providing the security service support to the Directory Access Protocol (DAP). This may be viewed as an interim option for the directory service implementation before the militarised DAP is finalised and its trusted directory user agent becomes available. Specifically, this paper focuses on the necessary protocol elements of MSP for supporting the security requirements of the DAP.						